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Since the income tax amendment to the Constitution of the United
States was adopted in 1913,1 followed by the series of Revenue Acts,
-
2
the courts of the United States have been quite regularly employed in
the difficult task of determining the meaning of the term "income."
The task is not alone one of statutory construction, for, since the six-
teenth amendment grants Congress the power to tax incomes only, the
court must frequently decide whether a given subject matter is income,
before considering whether a given revenue act purports to tax it.
Moreover, although income taxation was resorted to for a compara-
tively brief period during the Civil War, the history of federal income
taxation is relatively short, and, for this reason, many difficult cases
cannot yet be hung upon the peg of judicial precedent. Hence, there
is still room for speculation as to the proper treatment for income tax
purposes of some rather common sorts of receipts, since some of the
more interesting cases have never been passed upon by higher authority
than the Treasury Department. Among these are annuities and sim-
ilar periodical payments, which have not yet been assigned a place by
the courts in the scheme of federal taxation, although they have invited
a rather varied treatment at the hands of the Department.
The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
The amendment was certified by the Secretary of State on February 25, 1913, to
have been ratified by the requisite number of states.
'Acts of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat. at L. 114, 166) ; September 8, 1916 (39 Stat.
at L. 756) ; March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. iooo) ; October 3, 1917 (4o Stat, at L.
3oo) ; February 24, igig (4o Stat. at L. 1057) ; November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. at L.
227).
' For a discussion of the Civil War income taxes, see Seligman, The Income
Tax (2d ed. 1914) 43o et seq.
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To give point to the discussion of their income tax liability, we may
divide into four groups the commoner provisions for periodical
payments and annuities:
I. Annuity contracts entered into as commercial or business trans-
actions whereby A transfers money or property to B in consideration
of B's agreement to pay an annuity to A or some other designated
beneficiary.
II. Annuity contracts not entered into as commercial or business
transactions, although as in I, A transfers property or money to B in
consideration of B's agreement to pay an annuity to a designated
beneficiary.
III. Terminable rights to the income of property held in trust.
IV. Terminable charges upon property, created by will.
Consider a typical case 6f the first group. A, a father, wishes to pro-
vide for monthly payments to his daughter X. He therefore procures
a ten year endowment policy in the ]9 life insurance company, which, in
consideration of a single payment of $15,000, agrees to pay X $ioo
,monthly for life, beginning ten years later, with provisions for other
beneficiaries in the event of X's death. At the end of ten years, A and
X being both alive, X begins to receive the monthly payments. Are
they taxable income to her?
Although Sec. 213 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1921, defining gross
income, lists a number of forms of income, annuities are not included.
4
The section does not, however, purport to catalogue exhaustively all the
varieties of taxable receipts. It will be necessary, therefore, to examine
the other sections of the act to ascertain whether annuities were within
the legislative concept of "gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever."
Annuities and annuity contracts are mentioned in at least three sec-
tions of the act, 213 (b) (2), 221, and 256. By paragraph (2) of Sec.
213 (b), 5 amounts received by an insured as a return of premiums paid
by him under an annuity contract are exempted from income taxation.
This provision inferentially aids the probable contention of the Treas-
ury Department that annuities are income. The Revenue Acts purport
'"SEc. 23. That for the purposes of this title .... the term 'gross income'-
(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compen-
sation for personal services, .... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,
or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce or sales, or dealings
in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived 'from any source whatever .... " 42 Stat. at L. at p. 238.5
$SEc. 213. That for the purposes of this title .... the term 'gross income -
(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxa-
tion under this title:
(i) The proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the
insured;
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to lay a tax upon incomes only, within the authority granted by the
sixteenth amendment. The exemption here given does not apply to
all annuity contracts, but only to parts of the payments of certain speci-
fied ones. The inference may, then, be urged, that Congress con-
sidered payments to an annuitant ordinarily to be income, for if to tax
such payments is to tax capital, no exemption would have been
necessary.
A more direct indication of the probable legislative intent is contained
in Sec. 221, which provides for withholding the tax on income of non-
resident aliens at its source.6 Congress here specifically named annui-
ties as one of the various kinds of income from which the tax was to be
withheld. It is noteworthy that a similar withholding provision, like-
wise naming annuities, has been included in all the Revenue Acts since
1913.7 Again in Sec. 256, which requires a return of information
from the payer, of the name o the recipient and the amount of income
over $IOOO, annuities are specified as one of the forms of income.'
These two provisions, therefore, would indicate that when Congress
used the term "income" elsewhere in the acts, it intended it to include
at least those items it listed here as constituting income, among them
annuities.
(2) The amount received by the insured as a return of premium or pre-
miums paid by him under life insurance, endowment or annuity con-
tracts, either during the term or at the maturity of the term mentioned
in the contract or upon surrender of the contract;
(3) The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent
(but the income from such property shall be included in gross
income) ;" 42 Stat. at L. p. 238.
(In this discussion, I have habitually referred to the provisions of the Revenue
Act of 192I, and U. S. Treasury Regulations 62 issued thereunder, rather than to
earlier acts or regulations. Important differences have generally been noted.)
4"SEc. 22i. (a) That all individuals, corporations, and partnerships, in what-
ever capacity acting .... having the control,. receipt, custody, disposal, or pay-
ment, of interest,... rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,
remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical
gains, profits, and income of any non-resident alien individual .... shall ....
deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits and income a tax
equal to eight per centum thereof ... " 42 Stat. at L. at p. 248.-(italics mine)
Art. 362 of U. S. Treasury Regs. 45 and 62, interpreting this provision, reads:
"Only (a) fixed or determinable, (b) annual or periodical income is subject to
withholding. Among such income, giving an idea of the general. character of
income intended, the statute specifies interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums,
annuities, compensations, remunerations, and emoluments. But other kinds of
income may be included.... That the length of time during which the payments
are to be made may be increased or diminished in accordance with someone's will
or with the happening of an event does not make the payments any the less
determinable or periodical. .. ."
"Act of October 3, 1913, Sec. II, Par. E (38 Stat. at L. 114, 169) ; Act of Sept.
8, i916, Sec. 9 (b), as amended October 3, 1917 (39 Stat. at L. 300, 332
) ; Sec.
221, Act of February 24, 1919 (4o Stat. at L. io57, 1072).
'"SEc. 256. That all individuals, corporations, and partnerships, in whatever
capacity acting . . . . making payment to another individual, corporation or
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Since annuities are not specifically designated in Sec. 213 as part of
gross income, it will be desirable to determine as definitely as we can
what that word means, relying upon the indications from the other
portions of the act as only one step in the determination. It is well
established that Congress used the term "income" in its ordinary mean-
ing commonly understood by the people at the time they adopted the
sixteenth amendment.9 The economist's definition is quite broad: "the
money value of the net accretion in one's economic power between two
points of time."'10 The courts, however, as in Merchants' Loan 5
Trust Co. v. Smietanka" have generally refused to adopt economists'
or lexicographers' definitions, relying upon what they -conceive to be
more generally understood meanings. The judicial concept of income
may be illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States
v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co.:'
2
"However, the tax, though it includes income 'from all sources'
nevertheless includes 'income' only, and the meaning of that word is not
to be found in its bare etymological derivation. Its meaning is rather
to be gathered from the implicit assumptions of its use in common
speech. The implied distinction .... is between permanent sources of
wealth and more or less periodic earnings .... The word unquestion-
ably imports, at least so it seems to us, the current distinction between
what is commonly treated as the increase or increment from the exercise
of some economically productive power of one sort or another, and the
power itself."
The same distinction is brought out by Justice Pitney in the majority
opinion in Eisner v. Macomber.3  These opinions both show that the
partnership, of interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensa-
tions, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits
and income .... of $1ooo or more in any taxable year .... shall render a true
and accurate return to the Commissioner .... setting forth the amount of such
gains, profits and income.. . ." 42 6tat. at L. at p. 269.-(italics mine)
Art. io73 of Regs. 62 provides in part: "Payments of the following character,
although over $iooo, need not be reported in returns of information .... (f)
annuities representing the return of capital." This administrative provision is
probably designed to carry out the statutory exemption granted by Sec. 213 (b)
(2) (note 5 supra), although there may be a question whether the terms "return
-of premium paid" are synonymous with "return of capital." The statutory pro-
-vision might be literally interpreted to mean that part of the premiums actually
returned by the company during the course of the insured's payments, as, for
example, the so-called dividends paid by a mutual insurance company. The
Department has not, however, interpreted the statute thus narrowly.
'Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka (1921) 255 U. S. 509, 519, 41 Sup.
Ct. 386, 388.
0 The Federal Income Tax (Lectures at Columbia University, 1921) 7; cf.
Seligman, The Income Tax (2d ed. 1914) 19.
See note 9 supra.
(1918, C. C. A. 2d) 251 Fed. 211, 212.
(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193: "'Income may be defined as the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined'; provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets,
TAX LIABILITY OF ANNUITIES
two chief characteristics of most incomes are (i) more or less regular
recurrence over a period of time,' 4 and (2) separation from capital.
Although an annuity as defined by Coke: "An annuity is the yearly
payment of a certaine summe of money granted to another in fee for
life or yeares, charging the person of the grantor onely,"' 5 arguably
falls within these definitions, it would be more convincing to determine
with greater exactness whether annuities are commonly thought of as
income, by examining the income tax acts of other jurisdictions, which
preceded and succeeded our own.
The English income tax system was doubtless the most widely known
at the time the sixteenth amendment was adopted, for it had been in
continuous operation since 1842.16 During that whole period, England
has taxed annuities as incomes. 7  To be sure the English schedules
specifically refer to "annuities" and "annual payments" as being taxable.
But it is notable that the English judges have not applied the tax to all
periodical payments, but have endeavored to distinguish the thing tax-
able as an annuity from other receipts fesembling it, and sometimes
even loosely called annuities.' The distinction may be indicated by
to which it was applied in the Doyle Case. [Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. (gi8)
247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct 467. The quotation is from Strattons Independence v.
Howbert (913) 231 U. S. 399, 415, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 140.]
"Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of
income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The Govern-
ment, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief
emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety of
meanings; while the significance of the next three words was either overlooked
or misconceived. 'Derived-from--capital;-'the gain-derived-from-capital,'
etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital, not a
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of
exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed from the capital
however invested or employed, and coning in, being 'derived,' that is, received or
drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;
-that is income derived from property. . ."
" To be sure, in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka (supra note 9),
and in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. referred to by the court in Eisner v. Macomber
(note 13 supra), the Supreme Court held that a gain derived from a sale or con-
version of capital assets was income. These decisions do not, of course, change
the general proposition that the common conception of income involves a
periodicity of receipt. See also Trefry v. Putnam (1917) M ass. 522, 116
N. E. 9o4; L. R. A. 1917, F 8o6, note.
" Coke, Littleton, *x44 b; quoted with approval in Kent, Commentaries ( 4 th
ed. i889) Part VI, *46o; i Bouvier, Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914) 201.
"For the earlier English income tax acts, see Dowell, Income Tax Laws (8th
ed. 1918) lxv et seq. The i8o3 Act (43 Geo. III, c. 122) taxed "Profits arising
from" annuities as income.
T See Income Tax Act of I842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35) sec. 1O2; Income Tax Act of
1853 (16 & 17 Vict c. 34) sec. 2; Income Tax Act of 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. V, c.
40) sched. D.
' The distinction is well put in an excellent article by John M. Maguire, Capital-
ization of Periodical Payments by Gift (92o) 34 H Av. L. REV. 2o, 28.
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two quotations, one from an early and one from a recent English case.
In Foley v. Fletcher Baron Watson said :1' "An annuity means where
an income is purchased with a sum of money, and the capital has gone
and has ceased to exist, the principal having been converted into an
annuity." In other words, the true annuitant does not actually receive
back any part of the principal he paid, but merely an income purchased
with it. 20 That income is taxable. The difficulty of making the dis-
tinction, but its essential validity, is indicated by Rowlatt, J., .in Jones
v. Comn'rs. of Inland Revenue.21
"There is no law of nature or any invariable principle that because it
can be said that a certain payment is the consideration for the transfer
of property it must be looked upon as price in the character of principal.
In each case, regard must be had to what the sum is. A man may sell
his property for a sum to be paid in instalments, and when that is the
case, the payments to him are not income. Foley v. Fletcher, 3 H. & N.
769. Or a man may sell his property for an annuity. In that case the
income tax act applies."
This English interpretation is, of course, no criterion in determining
the meaning of the Revenue Acts.22  It is useful, however, in ascer-
taining what is included in the term income as used in common speech.
The fact that, in other principal foreign states, in which incbme tax
acts were in operation at the time the sixteenth amendment was adopted,
annuities were usually expressly named as one form of income,23 also
indicates that the common conception of income includes such a
periodical receipt as an annuity.
Finally, such state income tax statutes as set forth in detail the
various forms of income virtually always include annuities. 24  Massa-
(1858, E ch.) 3 H. & N. 769, 784.
Compare the case considered by Blackstone in discussing usury, of the repay-
ment of borrowed money: "He therefore" (the borrower) "stipulates (in effect)
to repay annually, during his life, some part of the money borrowed; together
with legal interest for so much of the principal as annually remains unpaid, and
an additional compensation for the extraordinary hazard run of losing that princi-
pal entirely by the contingency of the borrower's death: all which considera-
tions, being calculated and blended together, will constitute the just proportion
or quantum of the annuity which ought to be granted." (Commentaries, Bk. II,
*461.)
Quaere, whether the instalments the lender receives in such a case would be
taxable in tote, even under the English acts. See Scoble v. Sec. of State [1902],
2K. B. 413, [19o3, C. A.] I K. B. 494, [19o3, H. L.] A. C. 299; East Indian Ry. v.
Sec. of State [i9o5, C. A.] 2 K. B. 413.
[1920] I K. B. 711, 714.
See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Sinietanka, cited in note 9 supra.
' The relevant provisions of the various income tax acts are given'in Reporfs
from His Majesty's Representatives Abroad, Respecting Graduated lnco'"e
Taxes in Foreign States (1913) at the following pages: Prussia, 42; Saxony, 65;
Austria, ioo; Switzerland, lO6-7; Zurich, 113; Berne, 116; Vaud, 117; The
Netherlands, 123; Denmark, 145.
"See-, e.g., Ala. Gen. Acts, igig, No. 328, sec. 330; Mass. Gen Laws, 1921, ch.
62, sec. 5; New York Laws, ii, ch. 627, sec. 366, subsec. 2; N. C. Consol. Sts.
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chusetts has taxed the "income from an annuity" at least in theory, since
I835,'2 and Louisiana has, since i878, taxed "the excess of all annuities,
salaries and incomes over $iooo derived from any source, except from
property taxed."28  In other words, such state legislatures as have con-
sidered the matter at all have regarded annuities as one form of income.
This is very good evidence that the ordinary understanding of the
word "income" as used in the United States, includes annuities as one
form thereof.
To summarize, then, such indications as the Revenue Acts themselves
afford'are to the effect that annuities are taxable income. The judicial
definitions are broad enough to include annuities as income, since the
stress therein is laid upon periodical recurrence and separation from
capital, both characteristic of an annuity. The best known income tax
acts existing at the time the sixteenth amendment was adopted, in
England and continental states, had been treating annuities as taxable
income for some time, and the same treatment has been generally fol-
lowed in the American states. Finally, so far as one can hazard an
opinion, it is very likely that the average layman or even the recipient
of an annuity considers it as income, to be utilized for current expendi-
tures, rather than to be hoarded to replace a wasting capital asset.
Consequently, it may be expected that the Treasury Department will
hold that annuities in general are taxable income, subject, of course,
to any exemptions or deductions granted by the Act. So far as the




It remains to erect on this general foundation a method of treat-
ment for the particular kinds of annuities and other periodical pay-
ments designated above. We may consider first the example already
given-an annuity purchased by A from the B life insurance company
for the benefit of his daughter X. We have already concluded that
igig, sec. 7795; N. D. Laws, 1919, ch. 224, sec. i; Or. Laws, 1923, ch. 279; Va.
Laws, 1918, ch. 219, see. i.
" Rev. Sts. 1835, ch. 7, sec. 4; Maguire, op. cit. supra note 18, at p. 36.
"La. Acts, 1878, No. 8, sec. i; see Kennan, Income Taxation (I9io) 2,5. The
tax seems not to have been efficiently collected, and apparently has not been levied
since 1899. Seligman, The Income Tax (2d ed. 19,4) 413.
' See, particularly, Regs. 45 and 62, Art. 47; Off. Dec. 27o, in i Cum. Bull. 76
(issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue weekly and cumulated semi-annually),
which is thus digested for publication: "An individual who receives income from
an annuity which has been purchased for his benefit by another person is not
liable for tax thereon until the payments received under the terms of the annuity
have equaled the amount paid or set aside to purchase or establish same." The
inference would be that thereafter the "income from an annuity" would be tax-
able. Quaere, whether the "income from an, annuity" is the whole amount
received.
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annuities in general will probably be treated as taxable income. Are
there any exemption provisions applicable to this case? Three para-
graphs of Sec. 213 (b) should be borne in mind as possessing possibili-
ties of relief for the annuitant.
2 8
In the example given, paragraph (i) would not apply, so long at least
as the insured A remained alive. The question of the applicability of
paragraph (2) is perhaps more difficult. If A was himself the bene-
ficiary of the policy, without question he would be entitled to some
exemption. 21 But his daughter X is the beneficiary, not the insured;
and she is not receiving a return of premiums paid by her. As we shall
have occasion to observe presently, this paragraph does not grant an
exemption to all annuities paid under contracts. It is reasonably
obvious that it would be held not to apply here.
The most serious contention of the annuitant would be based upon
paragraph (3). At the time the annuity was purchased for X by A,
it had an ascertainable value to X: the discounted amount of the pay-
ments X would receive during her expectancy.3" X is the donee bene-
ficiary of the A-B contract; in other words, the right to receive these
payments is a gift to her. Therefore, X should not be taxed on her
receipts from this policy until and unless they exceed the value to her
of her right to receive them, as of the time she became entitled to
them ;31 or, alternatively, the difference between this value and the total
See supra note 5.
SThe somewhat inartistic wording of the paragraph makes it questionable
exactly what exemption A is entitled to receive, if he is also the beneficiary:
whether to (i) that part of each annuity payment which is calculated to be a
return of a part of the principal sum paid the insurance company, or (2) an
amount equal to the aggregate of all premiums paid, before any payments are
taxable income. The Treasury Department has taken the second view in Art. 47
of Regs. 45 and 62.
"Art. 1563 of Regs. 62 provides in part, "In the case of property acquired by
bequest, devise, or inheritance, its value as appraised for the purpose of the
Federal estate tax or in the case of estates not subject to that tax its value as
appraised in the State court for the purpose of State inheritance taxes shall be
deemed its fair market value when acquired." According to the tables contained
in U. S. Treas. Regs. 63, relating to the Estate Tax, Art. I5, if X is, for example,
25 at the time the annuity becomes payable to her, its present worth is $21,363,288.
" See Off. Dec. i7o, quoted supra note 27. Compare I. T. 1776, published in
the Sept. io, 1923, Internal Revenue Bulletin. There a donor by written instrument
gave bonds to a trustee, to pay the income to X for life, and on his death to
deliver the bonds to an incorporated church. The donor wished to deduct the
present value of the church's remainder interest under Sec. 214 (a) (ii) of the
Revenue Act of 1921, as a contribution to a religious organization. It was held
that he might do so. Suppose the donor had directed the income to be paid to
another church during the life of X, should not the entire value of the bonds be
deductible by the donor, subject to the provisions of Sec. 214 (a) (ii) ? Then,
suppose the donor directed the income to be paid to a church for 25 years,
remainder to an individual X. Under I. T. 1776, should not the donor be per-
mitted to deduct the present value of the 25 year interest under the same section?
Similarly has not the donee of the income received a gift of that value?
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amount it is calculated X should receive over the period of her expec-
tancy is income to the beneficiary, to be spread in some way over the
period of expectancy. 32 Undoubtedly these arguments are persuasive
and, at one time or another, the Treasury Department has acceded to
them. 8 There is considerable force in the contrary position, however.
In the first place, what was the gift? It was not the various monthly
payments, for these are made by the insurance company to the
daughter in return for a valuable consideration received by the com-
pany. So far as there was any gift herein, it was of the right to receive
these monthly payments, acquired by the daughter as a donee bene-
ficiary of the insurance contract. The right to receive these payments
has not been taxed, nor does the Department show any intention of
taxing it. The question remains whether the payments themselves,
which were not and are not the subject of a gift, but which are being
paid by the company because it is its legal duty under the insurance
contract to pay them, constitute taxable income.8 4
If it then be urged that the exemption granted by paragraph (3) of
Sec. 213 (b) is of the value of the right to receive these payments, the
Department can fall back upon Sec. 215 (b), 38 which appeared for the
first time in the 1921 act. The deduction for shrinkage of the principal
fund there referred to would be claimed, of course, by virtue of the
contention that each monthly payment contains an increment of the
original sum paid for the contract as well as interest; hence that the
principal fund is wasting or shrinking to this extent.
8 6 The total
"See Off. Dec. ziog, 5 Cum. Bull. 92. The conflict between this latter
decision and Off. Dec. 17o does not seem to have been recognized in the official
publications of the Treasury Department
"See notes 31 and 32.
"An analogous result was reached in Off. Dec. 755, 3 Cum. Bull. 212, in which
the testator directed his executor to pay an annuity to B and C for their lives,
without designating a fund therefor. The executor purchased a single payment
endowment insurance policy on D's life, which provided for the payment of the
amount of the annuity to B and C. The amounts received by B and C were held
to be taxable income.
""SEc. 215. (a) That in computing net income, no deduction shall in any case
be allowed in respect of
(b) Amounts paid under the laws of any State, Territory, District of Columbia,
possession of the United States, or foreign country as income to the holder of a
life or terminable interest acquired by gift, bequest or inheritance shall not be
reduced or diminished by any deduction for shrinkage (by whatever name
called) in the value of such interest due to the lapse of time... 4" 2 Stat. at L.
at p. 242.
" The definition of income in the illuminating Report of the Royal Commission
on the Income Tax (i92o) expressly excludes this deduction for shrinkage, in
Par. 184: "We think that in that practical world which alone can be considered
for the purposes of taxation, the income which represents the taxable faculty is
not a mathematical abstraction, but that net receipt which in the hands of its
possessor is usually regarded as income, that is to say, as a receipt out of
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deduction thus claimed would be the amount of this original cost or
value of the annuity. Thus, if the daughter X is permitted an exemp-
tion from income tax of the value of her right to receive the annuity,
under Sec. 213 (b) (3), she will thereby obtain a deduction exactly
the same in amount as that forbidden in Sec. 215 (b). It is clear that
the purpose of adding this provision to the 1921 Act was to prevent this
type of deduction.3 7  Finally, a strong argument can be made for the
view that Congress did not intend to include intangible property
interests of this sort within the exemption provisions of Sec. 213
(b) (3)8
In conclusion, it appears that the Treasury Department has adopted
at least two different views in our first typical case; and might very well,
in the interests of increasing the revenue, overrule both in favor of a
third, largely based on new provisions in the 1921 Act. In this type of




The second type of annuity case involves what appears to be a fairly
common family settlement. A widow, A, owns Blackacre, which has
yielded her an income of about $5,oo per year. She wishes in her
later years to escape the responsibilities of management. She there-
fore proposes to her children B and C that she will convey Blackacre
to them if they will promise to pay her for her support a total of $5,000
per year during her life. This arrangement is duly consummated.
A number of troublesome income tax questions immediately arise.
(I) May the children B and C deduct on their income tax returns the
$5oo0 per year which they are paying A? (2) Is the $50o0 per year
which current expenditures may be met, subject possibly to some general saving,
but not (either in theory or practice) subject to any specific appropriation for the
replacement of the capital which is used in earning the income, and which
over a long period of years may waste in such use."
In Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, submitted by the Secretary of the
Treasury in November, igig, to the House Committee on Ways and Means, prior
to the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1921, it is said (p. 13) : "It has been
suggested that it is desirable also to clear from doubt the status of life
interests or estates. Life tenants have made claim for an obsolescence allow-
ance based upon shrinkage due to the mere passage of time in the so-called
capital value of the life interest. Certain State statutes and the decisions there-
under give color to the claim that the value of the life interest at the time received
is such a capital value as may serve as the basis of deductions for obsolescence. If
these claims are allowed, cases would arise in which a clear income from an
unimpared (sic) corpus divided between the life tenant and remainderman would
entirely escape taxation-the income from the property being wiped out by the
annual shrinkage or obsolescence of the so-called capital value of the life estate."
' See Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 367, 375.
TAX LIABILITY OF ANNUITIES
taxable income to the mother? (3) Has either party realized any gain
or loss from the mere making of the contract? (4) Finally, suppose
A dies after 5 years, and thereafter B and C sell Blackacre for $125,000.
Have B and C realized any taxable gain on this transaction?
i. If the parties really contracted here in fact as well as in form,
it is evident that the transaction was legally a purchase of the land at the
price of the promise to pay the annuity. Payments by the children,
under this construction, are a capital expenditure on account of the
purchase price of the land.8 9 There seems to be no basis for the
deduction of such payments on the income tax returns of the children.
4 0
But if the taxpayer can persuade the Department to look behind
the form of the transaction into its substance, he can make a very per-
suasive argument for a different treatment. In substance, the mother
was not bargaining for the equivalent of her property; she was willing
to give her children the property, provided she might have the equiva-
lent merely of its income. Gifts on condition are not unknown to the
law.4 1 It may be granted that the children gave the mother a promise
in exchange for the property; and that the Department will have some
difficulty in determining what transactions are to be treated as gifts;
what, as transfers for good consideration. That there is a recog-
nizable distinction is, however, declared by the Department itself in its
regulations relating to estate taxes. In Article 2o of Regulations 63,42
interpreting Sec. 4o2 of the Revenue-Act of 192I, it is provided that if
a transfer of property was not a bona fide sale for a fair consideration,
but the decedent reserved to himself income from the property trans-
ferred, the part of the property necessary to produce the income shall,
for purposes of the estate tax, be included in the gross estate. In other
words, such a transaction is treated as being in whole or in part a
transfer by way of gift to take effect upon the transferor's death, on
condition of the transferee's paying an annuity to the transferor.
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See Sec. 215 (a) (2) of the Act; Art. 293 and 24 (2) of Regs. 62.
' Note that we are here dealing with an isolated transaction. This result was
reached in I. T. i662, Cum. Bull. II-, p. 21. The same opinion was given in
I. T. 1242, published in Cum. Bull. I-i, p. 6i, and in I. T. 1484, Cune. Bull. 1-2, p.
66, with the qualification that if the transaction was entered into for profit, annuity
payments in excess of the value of the property received in exchange may be
deducted as a loss. But has the payer realized either gain or loss until he disposes
of the property he received? See Par. 3 and 4 infra.
'See, e.g., Bone v. Holmes (i9o7) 195 hass. 495, 8I N. E. 29o; Miller v. West-
er College (1898) 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432; 28 C. J. 646-7 and notes.
"This article is referred to in Art. 1563 of Regs. 62, evidently as defining
what the phrase "property acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance" means.
'The Department seems not to have adopted the gift on condition analysis in
an analogous case where it would have operated to the advantage of the revenues.
In Art. 47 of Regs. 62, it is provided: "Annuities paid by religious, charitable, and
educational corporations under an annuity contract are subject to tax to the extent
that the aggregate amount of the payments to the annuitant exceeds any amounts
paid by him as consideration for the contract." Surely these transfers to religious,
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On this basis, the children may properly contend that the amounts of
the income paid the transferor are deductible on their income tax
returns, for the reason that, in substance, the transferor has reserved
to herself the income from, the property to this extent."4 The conten-
tion that the transaction was not a contract but a gift on condition
would, of course, be more difficult to make where the promise of the
annuity was not specifically related to the income realized from any
property; where the transferee might dispose of the property freely,
and is merely under a personal obligation to pay certain sums to the
transferor.45
Thus the answer to the first question of this subdivision is by no
means clear; both the taxpayer and the Department can point to
previous rulings, which lead to opposite results.
2. Various reasons have already been advanced for considering an
annuity in general as taxable income. It is clear that the payments
which the mother here receives are an annuity within Coke's definition.
Is the mother entitled to the benefit of the exemption provision in Sec-
tion 213 (b) (2), already discussed?48 Certainly her attorney can
make a strong argument in her, favor.' 7 The Department may oppose
his contention with considerable force on the exact wording of the para-
graph. It is well settled that exemption provisions in a taxing statute
are to be strictly construed against exemption. 8 This exemption in
terms is limited to such amounts as are received by an insured as a return
of premiums under life insurance, endowment or annuity contracts. The
mother here was not an insured, although she may, on one construction,
have entered into an annuity contract. Moreover, the Department
might well contend that the periodical payments she receives represent
the income on the property she transferred, not a return of the
"premium"--the value of the property-itself.49 The payments then
would be taxable income to the annuitant.
charitable or educational organizations are generally no more bona fide sales for
good consideration than that in the main case. If the transferor, then, is receiv-
ing no more than the income of the property transferred, as is probably usually
the case (see Miller v. Western College, cited in note 41 supra), he might very
well be required to pay income tax thereon. The exemption in Sec. 213 (b) (2)
arguably would not apply, for the reasons given in Par. 2 infra.
See Subdivision IV infra for a similar situation.
Art. 20 of Regs. 63 provides, however: "A transfer is taxable in accordance
with these principles, whether the decedent reserved the annuity out of the
property conveyed, or payment thereof to him was made by the grantee upon an
express or implied condition to that effect."
See note 5 supra.
I. T. 1484, see note 40 supra, supports this view.
United States v. Dickson (1841, U. S.) i5 Pet. 141, 165; Commercial Health
& Accident Co. v. Pickering (1922, C. C. A. 4 th) 281 Fed. 539, 541.
'Of course, this treatment would be peculiarly applicable if the argument of
the children in Par. i supra prevails-that is, that the transfer was a gift on con-
dition of paying the income, or part of it, to the mother. If the children are
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The contention that the annuity payments are taxable income to the
recipient would not necessarily be inconsistent with a holding that the
amounts paid by the children are not deductible in their income tax
returns. It was pointed out in Jones v. Comm'rs. of Inland Revenue0
and in Chadwick v. Pearl Life Insurance Co.5 that property may be
purchased for (i) a lump sum; (2) a lump sum payable in instalments,
or (3) an annuity. The transaction is no less a purchase of the prop-
erty because of the difference in the method of paying the purchase
price.
3. Now can the Department search out a taxable gain, or be forced
to allow a deductible loss to either of the parties at the time of the
making of the contract? Consider first the case of the annuitant.
Under Article 1564 of Regulations 62, interpreting Section 202 (a) (b)
(c) of the Revenue Act of 1921, both a change in substance and a
change into the equivalent of cash are required to complete a transac-
tion from which income may be realized under this section. Although
a commercial annuity contract may have a market value, it is very
doubtful whether the promise of an annuity under a non-commercial
family arrangement can be said to have. Such promises are not mar-
ketable for two reasons: (i) since they are usually in the nature of
promises to support, they are non-assignable,52 and hence could not be
sold; (2) since they are not based on any calculation of the probable
expectancy of the annuitant, who may or may not be the normal healthy
individual to whom a commercial insurance company would issue a con-
tract, it would be practically impossible to find a buyer. Further, it is
questionable whether under existing court decisions taxable income is
realized from the acquisition of a mere hope of receiving income in
the future.
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Of course, if the Department chooses to treat the transaction as a
gift by the annuitant on condition of the payment of the annuity, no
gain or loss would be realized by the annuitant.
Now, consider the transaction from the point of view of the children.
Suppose we conclude that in a particular case, the payers of the annuity
in legal contemplation purchased Blackacre at the price of their prom-
ises. It is difficult to see how at that moment they realized any gain or
loss. To be sure, the Revenue Acts provide" a basis for determining
gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. Can the
allowed to deduct amounts paid the mother as being her income rather than
theirs, she will surely have to pay the tax on it See also IV infra.
[I92o] I K. B. 711, 714, quoted supra p. 234.
[19o5] 2 K. B. 507.
'Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 413 and cases cited; in addition, Re Shearn
(19ri) 38 Utah, 492, 114 Pac. I3I; Ann. Cas. 1913 B 547, note.
" United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co. (192o, W. D. La.) 269 Fed. 458;
Edwards v. Keith (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 231 Fed. 1o; Woods v. Lewellyn (1918,
C. C. A. 3d) 252 Fed. io6.
"4Sec. 202, Rev. Acts of 1918 and 1921.
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promise of the children to their mother be called property within this
section? Clearly it was not property in their hands; it would require
an exceedingly strained 'construction to hold the giving of one's own
promise, even for good consideration, to be the disposition of property
resulting in gain or loss. Nor should the termination of the children's
obligation by the death of their mother be treated as resulting in a tax-
able gain or loss to the children. To be sure, the amount paid out on
account of the property is then determined; but this is only one of the
two figures required to ascertain a gain or loss. Moreover, it is obvious
that their mother's death was not a disposition of property in the
children's hands within Sec. 2o2."5
4. If we adopt the view that the transaction between the children
and their mother was an exchange of property for a promise to support,
there seems to be no difficulty in calculating the gain or loss in the event
that, after the liability to pay the annuity is determined in some manner,
the children sell the property they received. In such a case, both the
purchase and the selling prices of the property are fixed.5 If, how-
ever, the liability to pay the annuity has not been determined at the time
the property is sold, it is certainly more difficult to calculate the taxable
gain or loss on the transaction. Although it is undesirable to resort to
expectancy tables, in view of the fact that such a calculation will never
accord with the actual facts, in this case no other basis would be more
reliable. Hence, the cost of the property should be taken to be the
product of the mother's expectancy at the time of the contract,
multiplied by the annual amounts to be paid by the children.57
If the transfer of the property is treated as a gift on condition of
paying the annuity, the basis fbr a determination of gain or loss fol-
lowing a disposition of the property by the children is governed by Sec.
202 (a) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1921.58
A less common type of annuity having characteristics common both
Accordingly, the view of the Department expressed in I. T. 1242 (see note 40
supra): "Should both A and his wife" (the annuitants) "die before the tax-
payer" (the payer of the annuity) "has repaid the principal to them, the excess of
the principal over the amounts already paid to them will represent income to the
taxpayer for the year in which liability for future payments ceases" appears
unsound. These rulings doubtless represent the desire of the Department to
search out and tax a gain at the earliest possible moment.
"Frequently, however, the taxable gain to the children would be very large,
since the annuity is ordinarily less than might have been purchased from a com-
mercial company with the same amount of property. This consideration is a
makeweight argument for treating the transaction as a gift on condition.
To th's effect, see Off. Dec. 945, 4 Cum. Bull. 44.
""In the case of such property, acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the
basis shall be the same as that which it would have in the hands of the donor or
the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift. . . . In the case
of property acquired by gift on or before December 31, 192o, the basis for ascer-
taining gain or loss from a sale or other disposition thereof shall be the fair
market price or value of such property at the time of such acquisition;"
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to I and II also deserves mention. Suppose- that A asserts some claim
against B, as for breach of promise, which B wishes to compromise
without litigation. In consideration of A's release of the claim, B
agrees to pay A annually $5ooo during A's life. If the conclusion
heretofore reached that annuities in general are taxable income is
sound, it is reasonably clear that the Treasury Department will be able
to exact a tax from A on the annuity she receives.59 For granted that
she surrendered a valuable right, she admittedly gave it up for an
annuity.60 These annual payments are not a replacement of any capital
expenditure on her part, nor are they instalments of any fixed purchase
price. Although the argument might be advanced again that the
exemption in paragraph 2 of Sec. 213 (b) 61 covers all annuities pur-
chased for valuable consideration,6 2 the wording of the paragraph
hardly supports such a view.6 3 The payer of the annuity would proba-
bly not be permitted a deduction therefor" for the reasons considered
in paragraph I above.
III
TERMINABLE RIGHTS TO THE INCOME OF PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST
The income tax liability of annual amounts received by the beneficiary
of a trust rests upon a somewhat stronger statutory basis than that of
'For such a holding, see Smith v. Shaw [igi8] P. Div. 47.
'The holding contained in Solicitor's Opinion 132, Cum. Bull. I-i, p. 92, that
damages received for alienation of affections and in I. T. 18o4 (Internal Revenue
Bulletin of October 15, 1923) that damages received for breach of contract to
marry are not taxable income would not apply, since these opinions contemplate a
lump sum payment. In our case, doubtless A could avoid income tax on the
amount received from B by bargaining for (I) a lump sum; (2) a lump sum
payable in instalments. In any case, the question would be, what did she bargain
for ?
Quoted in note 5 supra.
See supra p. 24o.
'An interesting variation of this situation occurs where A promises not to
contest a will, in consideration of an agreement by a beneficiary B to pay A an
annuity. The additional point is, of course, whether the amounts A receives are
in the nature of a bequest under the will and hence exempt. In most jurisdictions,
it is quite properly held that A takes his annuity under the contract and not under
the will. See Smith v. Shaw, supra note 59; Gleason and Otis, Inheritance Tax-
ation (3d ed. 1922) 94; Hastings v. Nesmith (igo5) 188 Mass. i9o, 74 N. E. 323;
Brandeis v. Atkins (igio) 2o4 Mass. 471, 90 N. E. 861; Baxter v. Treasurer
(i91) 209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854.
", Since this conclusion may effect a taxation of this amount twice, as part of
B's income not subject to deduction and as part of A's, it is open to practical ques-
tion at any rate. See, however, Justice Holmes's opinion in Ft. Smith Luwber
Co. v. Arkansas (1920) 251 U. S. 532, 40 Sup. Ct. 3o4. A's and B's attorneys may
also be able to use to advantage Gould v. Gould (1917) 245 U. S. I51, 38 Sup. Ct.
53, wherein it was held that monthly payments of alimony were not income tcr the
recipient under the 1913 Act. The Department would doubtless argue that the
Gould decision is really based upon the peculiar character of alimony, as a
substitute for a husband's support.
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the two classes of annuities already discussed. If the Department is
finally upheld in taxing the annuity received by A in case I above, it is
more than likely that it will be successful in taxing the amounts received
by the trust beneficiary. The large amounts frequently involved in
cases of this type, as well as the distinctive provisions of the statute,
makes detailed discussion desirable.
Suppose D dies testate, leaving securities worth $i,ooo,ooo to T in
trust to pay the income thereof to A, D's widow, for life; remainder to
B, D's child, absolutely. Suppose that the annual income to A amounts
to $4o,ooo. Does she realize any taxable income therefrom?
The contentions of the widow A will be similar to those advanced by
the recipient of the annuity purchased for her benefit by her father, con-
sidered in I above.65  Of these, the most likely is that D made A a
bequest to the extent of the value of A's life interest at the time of D's
death; that A should not be liable to income taxation on amounts she
receives from T until they exceed this calculated amount.68 By the use
of expectancy tables, a value can readily be placed upon A's bequest ;17
but it is equally true that this value is purely hypothetical and bound to
be inaccurate in any actual case. Of course these practical considera-
tions must give way, if A can bring her case within the statutory
exemption.
The stumbling-block in A's path is Section 219 of the Revenue Act of
1921.8 Its provisions outline a thorough-going system for the taxa-
'At P. 235.
This contention is based, of course, on the provisions of Sec. 213 (b) (3)
quoted in note 5 supra.
A might advance an alternative contention that the separate payments are a
series of bequests, and are exempt from income taxation in toto. In Off. Dec.
12o, I Cum. Bull. 84, the Department held that a donor of bond coupons must pay
income tax on the interest as it fell due. If so, does not the recipient take such
periodical payments tax-free?
' If A were 5o at the date of D's death, and the income of the trust estate to be
paid her was $4oooo per year, the value of A's interest at that time would be
$498,812.8o, according to the tables used for Federal Estate Tax purposes.
The pertinent provisions are:
"(a) That the tax imposed by sections 21o and 211 shall apply to the income of
estates or of any kind of property held in trust, including:
(2) Income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or unascertained
persons or persons with contingent interests;
(3) Income held for future distribution under the terms of the will or trust;
and
(4) Income which is to be distributed to the beneficiaries periodically, whether
or not at regular intervals, ....
(b) The fiduciary shall be responsible for making the return of income for
the estate or trust for which he acts. The net income of the estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner and on the same basis as provided in section
212,....
(c) In cases under paragraphs (I), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) .... the
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tion of trust estates. In such a case as we are considering, the terms of
the section state that the beneficiary shall pay the tax on his distributive
share. Hence if the share received by A in our case is in fact income,
its taxability is provided for in Section 219.
Many of the reasons for treating annuities as income apply here. If
"income" as used in the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Acts
has the meaning commonly understood in ordinary speech, it seems
unquestionable that the proceeds received from invested trust estates
fall within the term. It is highly unlikely that the popular conception
of the classification of these receipts as income is qualified by the tech-
nical calculation that, since the interest of the recipient is wasting as he
approaches the end of his expectancy, something should be deducted
from each payment to represent this shrinkage. 69
But, whatever the ordinary understanding may be, does the exemp-
tion of the value of property acquired by bequest or devise in Section
213 draw at least a portion of A's receipts from the trust out of the
operation of Section 219? Again, the contentions of the Department
will probably be those already noted under I supra.70  It will be con-
tended that the property received by devise or bequest by A was merely
the right to the periodical payments she receives; that the value of this
right has not been taxed as income.7 1  Again, the Department will rely
tax shall be imposed upon the net income of the estate or trust and shall be paid
by the fiduciary....
(d) In cases under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a),.... the tax shall not be
paid by the fiduciary, but there shall be included in computing the net income of
each beneficiary that part of the income of the estate or trust for its taxable year
which, pursuant to the instrument or order governing the distribution, is distribut-
able to such beneficiary, whether distributed or not ..... In such cases the bene-
ficiary shall, for the purpose of the normal tax, be allowed as credits, in addition
to the credits allowed to him under section 216, his proportionate share of such
amounts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 216 as are received by
the estate or trust." 42 Stat. at L. at p. 246.
' The conclusion is somewhat supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court
in the mining cases, in which it was held that, for purposes of the Corporation
Tax Act of i9o9, the income of mining corporations included the proceeds of
ores mined, without deduction for the value of such ore in place as depreciation
within the act, even though the production of this income involved, of course, PL
wasting of the capital asset, the ore. See Stratton's Independence v. Howbert
(1913) 231 U. S. 399, 415, 34 Sup. Ct 136, 140; Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land
Co. (917) 242 U. S. 503, 37 Sup. Ct. 202; United States v. Biwabik Mining Co.
(i918) 247 U. S. 116, 38 Sup. Ct. 462. See also the definition of income in
note 36 supra.
The possible hardship in this method of taxation in the English mining and
annuity cases has been considered in Murray and Carter, A Guide to Income Tax
Procedure (6th ed. i911) 318 et seq.
P. 236 et seq.
"For a discussion of the inclusion of the value of this right within the
exemption provision see the article by Maguire cited in note 38 supra.
See also Off. Dec. 755, 3 Cum. Bull. 212, digested in note 34 supra, for a similar
case in which the Department taxed an annuity provided by will.
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upon Section 215 (b), specifically providing that amounts paid to the
"holder of a life interest acquired by gift, bequest or devise shall not be
reduced by any deduction for shrinkage (by whatever name called) in
the value of such interest due to the lapse of time." This provision
was inserted particularly to meet the situation here treated.7 2  Whether
the same holding could be supported under the Revenue Act of 1918,
which did not contain the provisions of Section 215 (b), is of course
more doubtful.73
IV
TERMINABLE CHARGES ON PROPERTY, CREATED BY WILL
The result in the final case should depend almost entirely upon those
reached in the three preceding cases. A typical situation is this: T by
his will leaves real and personal property to his son B, charging the
real property with the payment of $5ooo per year to his widow A
during her life. Although Coke's definition of an annuity would not
include these payments, courts frequently so speak of them.74 The
regulations of the Treasury Department 5 provide that the $5ooo which
A receives is taxable income. The reasons for the insertion of this
provision must have been similar to those just considered under III-
that the amounts A receives are commonly understood to be .income,
and that the exemption provisions of Section 213 (b) (2) and (3) do
not properly apply, particularly in view of Section 215 (b) .7 Since
' See Notes on the Revenue Act of z9z8, p. 13, quoted in note 37 supra.
13 In Gavit v. Irwin (1921, N. D, N. Y.) 275 Fed. 643, the district court held
under the 1913 act that amounts received by plaintiff under provisions of a will
whereby an estate was bequeathed to trustees who were directed to pay plaintiff's
daughter during her minority amounts necessary for her support, and one half the
balance to plaintiff during his life and the life and minority of the daughter, were
not taxable income, on the theory that the plaintiff had no interest in the capital
of the trust fund. Quaere, whether this is a sound distinction. See Drummond v.
Collins [1914] 2 K. B. 643.
The judgment in the Gavit case was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit on December IO, 1923, on this ground: "While the moneys
received by the defendant-in-error are income as to the estate, they are not income
as to the defendant-in-error. We think he acquired the moneys by bequest or
devise and they are not taxable."
* "See e. g. Merrill v. Bickford (1876) 65 Me. II8; Wyckoff v. Wyckoff (1891,
Ch.) 48 N. J. Eq. 113, 21 Atl. 287.
Although the land is charged, the devisee becomes personally liable for the
payments of the sums to A, by accepting the devise. See 2 R. C. L. 7, and cases
cited in note to Stringer v. Gamble (19o9) 155 Mich. 295, 118 N. W. 979, in 30
L. R. A. (N. s.) 8,5 et seq.
"Art. 47 of Regs. 62 provides in part: " .... An annuity charged upon
devised land is income taxable to the annuitant, whether paid by the devisee out
of the rents of the land or from other sources."
" See Off. Dec. 755, 3 Cum. Bull. 212 (note 34 supra) for the case of an annuity
not charged on particular property, which, under the particular facts, was held
taxable income to the recipient. This ruling appears to be sound for reasons
given under Subdivision I supra.
TAX LIABILITY OF 4NNUITIES
this particular holding is embodied in the regulations, the attorney for
A would expect summary treatment at the hands of the Department of
a claim for exemption of all or part of these amounts. In the courts,
the best attack would be based on the provisions of the oft-cited Section
213 (b) (3), along lines already sufficiently familiar to the reader; its
success would be problematical.
The Regulations do not require the devisee to report as taxable
income the rents and profits paid to the annuitant, and deny him the
right to deduct from his taxable income any sums paid the annuitant.T
7
Since the periodical payments are an equitable charge upon the land,--
this exemption seems entirely justifiable, since to the extent of the




In the light of the historical background of income taxation gen-
erally, as well as of the specific provisions of the Revenue Acts, it is
quite likely that annuities in general will be considered to be taxable
income, subject to the exemptions granted by the acts. The scope of
these exemption provisions, however, is by no means clear. Although
the Department has not yet committed itself to any consistent course of
treatment, it would be expected to adopt a strict construction of the
exemptions according to their exact terms, in the full consciousness that
some anomalous situations are bound to result. The final presentation
and determination of these questions before the Federal courts will be
doubly important-because of the wide-spread ramifications of the
problems of annuities and similar periodical payments throughout the
whole field of income tax law and because of the very large sums of
money sure to be at stake.
I Art. 47, Regs. 62. Note that, if the annuity is greater than the rents, the
devisee would be personally liable to pay it, and: would not, under the Regulations,
be allowed any deduction therefor.
" See citations in note 74 supra.
